Understanding randomness in sports betting
Why you can rarely know whether a single bet was the right decision — even after you see the outcome.
I study the statistics and decision theory of sports betting and prediction markets — as a scientist, not a tout. The public conversation is crowded with picks, affiliate rankings, and models marketed as edge. I work the empty seat: the independent voice that says whether a model, a market, or a claim is actually real, and how you would ever know.
My peer-reviewed work formalizes optimal decision-making under uncertainty in betting markets. The throughline: a billion dollars of real money usually out-forecasts a spreadsheet, the closing line is the only honest benchmark, and a single tournament can never validate a probability. I care about calibration and honesty about variance — not selling winners.
A sportsbook’s expected profit turns out to be an exact affine function of a single quantity: the share of money that lands on the losing side. Under a model of public belief, that quantity is precisely the probability that a representative bettor picks the wrong side — a Bayes error. A book’s revenue is therefore a continuously updated measurement of how often a large population forecasts incorrectly.
The standard account of bookmaker profit assumes where the money goes is independent of how games end. Relaxing that recovers it exactly as the independent case.
The margin resolves into exactly three: the hold, price shading × the public’s lean, and the covariance between betting and outcomes.
In 1,139 MLB games, the public’s apparent tendency to back losers is present when games are pooled and absent within every stratum.
The public leans heavily toward favorites, but we find no evidence of the price shading that Levitt’s account requires, and the realized margin is indistinguishable from the guaranteed hold.
This is a null on that specific mechanism, not a demonstration of accurate pricing. A margin test carries power against mispricing aligned with where the money sits (88% in simulation) and little against mispricing oriented independently of it (6%). A book could misprice substantially in ways unrelated to the public’s lean and leave no trace in its margin.
On Goldman Sachs’s World Cup prediction model, I told CNN it amounts to a “fun exercise” that sits further from reality than the prediction markets — because “the information going into the model is a tiny sliver of all the information in the possession of the millions of people who have bet into prediction markets.” Markets aren’t perfect either; they overreact to injuries and lean toward unlikely outcomes — and ultimately it’s impossible to know who was right.
The recurring ideas I bring to every model, market, and claim.
Aggregated, money-backed forecasts price in information no hand-built model can see. The bar isn’t picking the favorite — it’s beating the closing market price.
The closing line is the single number that actually predicts outcomes. Beating it consistently is the real evidence of edge; everything else is narrative.
A “26% to win the World Cup” number can never be validated — the tournament runs once. Many published forecasts are confident about quantities that are, in principle, uncheckable.
Sportsbook odds sum past 100%; near-zero-vig exchanges already read as probabilities. Comparing the two without removing the vig is the most common way analyses go wrong.
Aggregated independent forecasts converge to a robust estimate — but herding and favorite–longshot bias are real. The market is the best available estimate, not the truth.
A good forecaster is judged by calibration and honesty about variance, not by a winning week. You usually cannot know from one outcome whether a decision was right.
The peer-reviewed and open-source backbone behind the commentary.
A decision-theoretic framework for when a bet is objectively good or bad, independent of whether it wins — and what that implies for staking and evaluation under uncertainty.
Bookmaker profit is an exact affine function of the share of money on the losing side — the public’s Bayes error. Generalizes the standard model of bookmaker profit, and shows that the public’s apparent tendency to back losers is a Simpson’s paradox.
A quantile-regression model for NFL point spreads with full backtesting. Deep-dives will appear here as they’re ready.
Accessible essays on the statistics of betting. A newsletter is in the works.
Why you can rarely know whether a single bet was the right decision — even after you see the outcome.
Testing the “crossing key numbers” conventional wisdom on NFL teaser legs across multiple seasons.
I’m a standing resource for stories on betting models, prediction markets, and forecasting — the independent academic angle, not a tipster’s. Quick to respond, comfortable on deadline, and happy to translate the statistics into plain English.